


THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY.



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THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY.

The following papers, with slight modifications, and the exception of article No. XI, have lately appeared in the MORNING CHRONICLE of Quebec. The soundness of the views advocated by General Hewson, in that part of his case from the Pacific to Norway House, is fully borne out by the report on the Peace River District, from the Chief Engineer, Mr. Sandford Fleming, just laid before Parliament; and we have but little doubt that when the remaining portion of the route from Norway House to Quebec has been explored, it will be found to be equally feasible and advantageous, and will lead to the final adoption of this route as the truly Imperial and National location. For further and more ample details with reference to this the great question of the day, we would refer our readers to the pamphlet, accompanied with a map, lately issued by General Hewson, and which should be in every persons hands.

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY.

ARTICLE I.

A STARTLING PROPOSITION.

General M. B. Hewson, formerly Chief Engineer of the Memphis and Charleston and several other leading American railway lines, has written a pamphlet on the subject of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which has been reviewed in the October number of *Rose-Belford's Monthly*. The perusal of these papers will prove interesting and instructive. The General condemns in energetic terms the present location of our projected national highway; and contends, that the four millions spent in preliminary surveys have been, for all practical purposes, thrown away, our engineers having failed to discover the best, or even a reasonably practicable route for the railway. His objections to the present location may be summed up as follows:—That the Eastern terminus of the road—which, in all common sense, should have been fixed at tide water—is placed in the woods at Lake Nipissing. That from Lake Nipissing to the head of Lake Superior the railway will run through a miserable rocky country, unfit for settlement, and necessitating works of a most costly character, besides being exposed for 150 miles, along the shores of Lake Superior, to seizure by U. S. armed vessels. That from Thunder Bay to Selkirk, on the Red River, the line will pass through a country of much the same character, and so near the frontier as to be within two days march of a hostile army. That, from Red River to the Rocky Mountains, the

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line, although tending to the North-West, has nevertheless been located too far South, so much so, that for 500 miles it will run through the American Desert, a sandy barren which crosses the boundary line from the United States, and stretches for some distance into Canadian territory. That the point selected for the passage through the Rocky Mountains is much higher than could have been found by going further North, Yellow-head Pass being at an elevation of 3,800 feet, as against 1,800 at the Peace River Pass. That the route selected in British Columbia runs through the wildest and most difficult part of that Province, a "Sea of mountains," as it has been most appropriately termed; and finally reaches the Pacific Ocean at Burrard Inlet, under the guns of the American Fort of San Juan. That so long as the section from Thunder Bay to Lake Nipissing is not built—and which most likely will not be for many years to come, owing to the enormously costly character of the works—our national highway will be under our control during only the season of navigation. For six months of the year its traffic will feed the railway system of the United States, and during the other six months our neighbors will compete with us for its traffic on at least equal terms. That the cost of the line as projected is excessive, the sections now under construction from the head of Lake Superior to Red River ranging from \$27,000 to \$83,000 per mile; and it may be further stated, the tenders now under consideration for the sections—127 miles in length—from Yale to Kamloops, in British Columbia, reach up to \$15,000,000, exclusive of rails and rolling stock. On this basis the 500 miles through British Columbia will probably cost fifty millions. That the line, running almost throughout its entire course in close proximity to the boundary line, can never realize the requirements of a national highway. General Hewson, as the remedy for this most alarming condition of affairs, proposes a route which, although at first sight it may appear somewhat novel and astonishing, is nevertheless

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based on evidence of the strongest and most trustworthy character, and which may be briefly sketched, as follows:— Starting from Quebec, and following the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway Company's road, now under construction, to La Tuque, the line continues on up to the headwaters of the St. Maurice, thence across the watershed of the Hudson Bay region, down the Harricanaw River, crossing the Abbitibee and Moose Rivers, and through these rivers connecting with the navigation of James' and Hudson's Bays; thence crossing the Albany River, and running due West to Norway House, at the North end of Lake Winnipeg. From this point the line runs direct to Cumberland House, touching the North Bend of the Saskatchewan River, tapping its navigable waters. Thence crossing the Beaver and Arthabaska Rivers running North of, and close to Lesser Slave Lake, crossing the Smoky River, and up the Peace River Valley and Pass, and from thence down the Skeena River, the line reaches Portland Inlet, or Port Essington on the Pacific. With Quebec the summer and Halifax and St. John the winter termini on the Atlantic; with a bridge or a railway steam ferry at Quebec; and with a branch line of some 350 miles from James Bay up the Abbitibee and down the Montreal Rivers to Mattawa, to connect the line with Montreal and Toronto, General Hewson claims that this route will be, in all probability, infinitely cheaper to build than the present location; besides being 240 miles shorter from sea to sea, a saving in distance which he estimates to be equivalent to a million dollars per annum in the working expenses of but six daily trains. If found to be practicable, it will be seen at a glance, that this line possesses all the elements of a truly national and imperial highway. It is the shortest line possible between the Atlantic and the Pacific; it passes through the back country of the Dominion from ocean to ocean; it is removed from the possibility of capture by an enemy, and furnishes a line of military transport available during all seasons of the year, being

thus free from those objections from a military point of view which may now prevent Imperial co-operation ; it opens up and runs entirely through the great belt of arable lands from Norway House to the Rocky Mountains, and more especially through the magnificent Peace River Territory, described in such glowing terms by Captain Butler. It likewise utilizes all the large rivers throughout its course, flowing either to the South into the great lakes or to the North into the Arctic Ocean, or Hudson's Bay ; bringing Manitoba, through the latter outlet, closer to Liverpool for four months of the year than New York is. It will, by carrying the traffic of the far West to Quebec in summer, and through Quebec to Halifax and St. John in winter, develop trade and intercourse between the Provinces, mould the people of this Dominion into a homogeneous nation, and realize their most cherished aspirations, the perpetuation of British power and institutions in this northern portion of the continent. The first argument which will naturally be advanced against the feasibility of this route will be the climate of the country between Quebec and Norway House. In anticipating this objection, General Hewson does not depend upon his personal knowledge of the country, but rests his case upon evidence, which he quotes from Canadian geologists, scientists and explorers, and from officials of the Hudson Bay Company, and with the result of completely upsetting all our preconceived notions of the territory in question.

The whole subject is presented in a new and striking light, and is deserving of the immediate and serious consideration of the Government and people of the Dominion ; and any further expenditures upon the present location—excepting, however, the section between the head of Lake Superior and the Red River, which is now well advanced towards completion, and which will serve an immediate and distinct requirement—should be suspended until

General Hewson's route has been thoroughly tested under the American system of cross-section surveys, followed by several trial lines, which he states can be done at a cost of not over \$150,000. We shall reserve for another issue a brief description of the country to be traversed by General Hewson's line, together with a review of the evidence upon which the General rests his case.

ARTICLE II.

GENERAL HEWSON AND THE PACIFIC RAILWAY.

In our last article upon this subject we drew attention to the advantages claimed by General Hewson for the new route recommended by him for the Pacific Railway. The principal of these advantages, as contrasted with the line at present located, are, that it is the shortest line by 240 miles from ocean to ocean; that being, throughout its length, remote from the frontier, it will open up the back country of this Dominion, and be removed from the possibility of capture, thus rendering Imperial assistance far more probable; that it will feed, and be fed, by the great navigable waters of the centre of the Continent—the Skeena, Peace, Athabasca, Mackenzie, Saskatchewan, Nelson and Moose Rivers; Lesser Slave, Athabasca and Winnipeg Lakes, and Hudson's Bay, that great inland sea teeming with valuable fish; that it will give to Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia a share of the trade which the other line would divide between Ontario and the United States; and finally that it will pass through the greatest belt of fertile land on the Continent. We wish, to-day, to notice more particularly the climate and soil of the immense territory through which the Hewson line will pass. Mr. Sandford Fleming, in his reports upon the Pacific Railway, divides the country on his line into three sections—the Western, or mountainous region, the Central, or prairie region, and the Eastern, or woodland region. It may not be amiss to apply these divisions to the Hewson route, and to compare the corresponding sections in both cases. The Eastern, or woodland section, of the Hewson

line may be said to extend from Quebec to Norway House at the north end of Lake Winnipeg, a distance of about 1,200 to 1,300 miles. The climate of this region has always been popularly conceived to be very rigorous, especially in the neighbourhood of Hudson's Bay; and the soil very unsuitable for cultivation. In shewing that this supposition is exaggerated General Hewson does not advance any theories of his own, but gives the experience of Professor Bell, the officers of the Hudson's Bay Company and others. Of the country between Quebec and the sources of the St. Maurice there is not a great deal of information given. It is for the most part rough and hilly, abounding in timber, but without a great deal of land fit for settlement. Where good land is available, he gives us as an instance of its productiveness, the wonderful agricultural progress and wheat raising capacity of the Lake St. John district, in the same latitude, in which there are millions of acres of fertile lands, as may be seen from reports in the Quebec Crown Lands Department, and the excellent crops raised by the lumbering firms on the Upper St. Maurice. Referring to the height of land between the St. Maurice and Hudson's Bay, Mr. Richardson, of the Geological Survey, says: "Mr. Burgess, of the Hudson's Bay Company's post here, furnished me on the 7th August, with fair sized new potatoes." Mr. McQuat, of the same survey, reports "that he found Pine trees which measured eight or nine feet in circumference." Mr. Gladman, in his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1857, speaking of New Brunswick House, a post south of James' Bay, says: "the soil very good; raised excellent potatoes and every description of vegetable; oats ripens very well; had barley also, and wheat has since been tried with success. Cattle kept there, housed during winter." Of Moose Factory, on James' Bay, Gladman says: "climate and soil good: raised potatoes and other vegetables in great abundance; barley ripened well."

Robson says : "Fall wheat stood the winter frosts, and grew very well in the following summer." Professor Bell, says : "upwards of 80 head of cattle are kept at Moose Fort, besides horses, sheep and pigs." Robson, in his history, says of the country south of Hudson Bay :—"The soil is fertile, and the climate temperate for the produce of all kinds of grain, and for raising cattle ; and the coasts abound with black and white whales, seals, sea-horses, and various kinds of fish."

An official map, published by the Chief Engineer of the Canadian Pacific Railway, states that the great tract of country south of Hudson's Bay, is "a flat country ; soil, loam and clay, good quality."

The thermometrical observations of temperature also seem to prove that there has been a good deal of misconception as to the climate of this region, which would seem to be certainly better than that of the country north of Lake Superior. They shew that the average summer temperature of the following places is :—

Quebec	61.40
Ottawa	61.—
Moose Factory (James' Bay).....	62.20
Fort William (Lake Superior).....	59.94
Norway House (Lake Winnipeg).....	59.87
Cumberland House (Saskatchewan District).....	62.62
Winnipeg (Manitoba).....	60.30

So much for the soil and climate of the "woodland region" of General Hewson's line, from Quebec to Norway House. As compared with the corresponding section on Fleming's line, consisting of the extremely rough and barren country, from Lake Nipissing to Thunder Bay, and the almost equally uninhabitable district from Thunder Bay to Selkirk, on the Red River, the choice in point of density and quality of timber and nature of soil and climate,

would seem to be in favor of the former; and this may be, to some extent, accounted for by the difference in elevation, which Hewson says will not exceed an average of 400 to 500 feet on the northern line, as against probably 1,000 feet on the southern. As regards cost of construction the General says: "While the 1,000 miles east of Manitoba (on the Fleming line) involve heavy works, ranging from \$27,000 to \$83,000 per mile, and unfavorable lines, the corresponding 1,000 from Norway House eastward, involves in all likelihood, good lines and light works;" and he then states, that if the twenty millions now being invested in the railway between Lake Superior and Manitoba, had been applied to his line, it would not only have connected Quebec with Hudson's Bay, but would have carried the railway 700 miles further westward, completely through the "woodland region," to "the threshold of the western granary, at Norway House," at the north end of Lake Winnipeg.

The Central or Prairie Region of the Hewson line extends from Norway House to the Rocky Mountains, and is described as "a vast region containing a high proportion of extraordinary richness, and at its western end affording the most fertile land in the world available for settlement," more ready in its natural "state for immediate cultivation than any other on earth—the future granary of Europe." At Norway House, according to Colonel Crofton, corn, rhubarb, peas, cabbages and other vegetables are grown. At Cumberland House, Dr. King stated, in his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1859, he "saw farms growing luxuriant wheat, corn and barley." At this point the Hewson line would tap the lower Saskatchewan, bringing into play 1,000 miles of navigation, and the immense territory drained by that river. Indeed it may be said, that all the good prairie land on the Fleming line will thus become tributary to the newly projected route.

At Lac la Biche, lat 54.45, Captain Butler says:—"The Indians and half-breeds raise an abundance of wheat and other cereals, together with enormous crops of potatoes and garden vegetables." At Little Slave Lake, further West, Professor Macoun says he "found barley in stack on the 12th August." At Fort Athabaska, lat. 56.40, Macoun says he "obtained specimens of wheat and barley which astonished everyone who saw them, many of the ears containing 100 grains, and the weight of both wheat and barley being nearly ten pounds per bushel over the ordinary weight." Further West, in the Peace River district, the proposed railway will traverse from East to West an immense country, which Sir George Simpson terms "the very Eden of our North." At one post on this river, which is navigable for large steamboats for several hundred miles, in lat. 58.24, Macoun says "barley sown on the 8th of May was cut on the 6th of August, the finest I ever saw—many ears as long as my hand." At another post the wheat weighed 68 lbs. per bushel, and oats 58 lbs. Captain Butler speaks of this country as—"A terraced land of rich rolling prairies—a park-like land of wood and glade and meadow, where the jumping deer glanced through the dry grass and trees." Sir Alexander Mackenzie says:—"The country is so crowded with animals (a testimony of its richness) as to have the appearance in some places of a stall yard." Dr. King says:—"The trees are very vast and splendid in their growth. They are like the magnificent trees around Kensington Park, and would bear comparison with any thing of the kind." And yet this magnificent country will be entirely left out by the Government location of the railway, which will run far to the South. The climate of this territory is very favorable. Mackenzie says that on the Upper Peace River the snow had all disappeared on the 5th April, and that anemones were in flower on the 20th of the same month in 1793. Captain Butler says:—"With bud and sun and shower came the

first mosquito on the 20th April, 1873." The mildness of the climate is no doubt due to the influence of the "Japan Sea," the great gulf stream of the Pacific, which tempers it to such an extent, that wheat may be grown at Fort Simpson in lat. 61.5, and barley as far North as Fort Norman, lat. 64.31, or 1,000 miles further North than Quebec. The immensity of this fertile country may be judged from the fact that it embraces ten degrees of latitude and thirteen of longitude, and that the Mackenzie River, discharging in the Arctic Ocean, furnishes 2,000 miles of navigation.

Such is the Central, or Prairie region, of General Hewson's line. We have already described the corresponding section of the Fleming line, which runs for 500 miles of its length through the "American Desert;" we may further add that Captain Butler says "there are ten acres of fertile land lying North of the Saskatchewan, for every one acre lying South of it—" and "the present line is eminently unsuited for settlement, and may be said to lie fully 80 miles too far South."

The Western, or Mountainous region, through which the Hewson line passes, begins where the Peace River flows eastward through the Rocky Mountains, affording a pass only 1,800 feet above the sea, as against 3,800 feet at Yellow Head pass, the point now selected,—and crosses British Columbia through the gold fields to the Pacific coast opposite to the Queen Charlotte Islands, which are very large and are said to enjoy a mild climate, to possess valuable coal and minerals and a much better soil than Vancouver, being described as "rich beyond description." General Hewson says but little about the soil of the mainland. Possibly there may not be a very great choice in this respect between it and the present location; but the country has the advantage of a lower elevation, shorter

distance, and cheaper works of construction than on the other line. The evidence of Captain Butler on this most important point is very conclusive. In his "Wild North Land"—page 356—he says:—"The Peace River affords a passage to the Western Ocean, vastly superior to any of the known passes lying South of it. It is level throughout its entire course. It has a wide, deep, navigable river running through it. Its highest elevation in the main range of the Rocky Mountains, is about 1,800 feet. The average depth of its winter fall of snow is but three feet. From the Western end of the pass to the coast range of mountains, a distance of some three hundred miles across British Columbia, there does not exist one single formidable impediment to a railroad." Contrast this with the country through which the Fleming line passes, from Yellow Head Pass by the Thompson and Fraser Rivers to Burrard Inlet—bristling with tremendous mountains, and necessitating works of construction involving an outlay of over \$80,000 per mile, exclusive of rails and rolling stock, as established from the tenders awarded for the sections from Yale to Kamloops—125 miles in length—and upon which basis the 500 miles in British Columbia would swallow up some fifty millions of dollars. We have given as lengthy a description of the climate and soil of the too great rival routes of the Pacific Railway as our limited space will permit. We shall endeavor, in a future issue, to show what should, and we hope will be, the action of the Government and people of the Dominion in face of the momentous issues which have been raised by General Hewson, and which, most assuredly, cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged.

ARTICLE III.

THE DUTY OF THE HOUR.

Having briefly reviewed, in our issues of the 28th ult. and 5th instant, the defective location of our National Railway, and the superior merits of the route advocated by General Hewson, it may not be amiss to-day to compare the mode of construction adopted with that advised by the General.

The actual position of this great work may be stated as follows:—Nothing has been attempted between Lake Nipissing and Thunder Bay beyond running several experimental lines. The construction of this section of 600 miles has been indefinitely postponed in consequence of the excessively costly character of the works, necessitated by the exceedingly difficult nature of the country north of Lake Superior. From estimates ranging from \$30,000 to over \$80,000 per mile, an average cost of \$60,000 per mile for this section may be safely deduced. The road between Thunder Bay and Selkirk—410 miles—is in course of construction, at an average cost of \$44,000 per mile, as appears from the report of the Chief Engineer for 1879; and, when fully completed and equipped, will exceed \$50,000 per mile. Nothing, as yet, has been done between Selkirk and the Rocky Mountains—a distance of 1,000 miles—but, somewhat singular to say, the Government have under contract a hundred miles or so of railway running west from Winnipeg, which appears to be of a purely local character, and independent of the trunk line. From the more favorable nature of the Prairie Region, an average cost of construction, through this country, of say

\$20,000 per mile, completed and equipped, would be a safe basis of calculation. In British Columbia contracts have just been awarded for over \$10,000,000, for 125 miles of road, exclusive of rails, rolling stock and extras, from Yale to Kamloops—fortunately, however, these contracts have not as yet been definitely closed. On this basis the 500 miles through this Province would probably average over \$100,000 per mile.

It would thus appear that under the present system over \$180,000,000 of capital will be absorbed in the building of 2,700 miles of our great trunk line—an average of say \$48,000 per mile.

Is Canada, with her population of 4,000,000 scattered over the breadth of the continent, equal to the strain involved in such an immense outlay? Has the very serious nature of the burden, which will result from this outlay, been duly considered?

The construction, and subsequent working of 1,500 miles of railway through a country offering no field for settlement, such as the region north of Lake Superior, and in British Columbia, have been described, affords matter for deep and anxious reflection. May not this policy turn out most difficult of execution, and, if carried out, an everlasting and ruinous drain on the resources of the country?

The information available on this question from the working of the Intercolonial Railway, under more favorable circumstances, and which nevertheless, according to the Parliamentary returns, shows a loss of nearly \$500,000 on last year's operations, is certainly not of a reassuring character.

An average cost of \$48,000 per mile would appear to be beyond both the present requirements of this railway, and

the finances of the country, applicable at best only in old, rich and thickly settled communities; and furthermore likely to imperil the future usefulness of the road. In designing this great work the bitter experience gained in the Grand Trunk, Intercolonial, and other trunk lines, where the fatal consequences resulting from defective locations and excessive costs of construction, are still, and will continue for all time to come, to be felt, should not have been discarded.

And that the present location of the railway—upon which its future depends—has been determined upon an incomplete knowledge of the country—a fact which will produce widespread anxiety throughout all classes of the community—would appear to be admitted from the following extracts from the report of the Chief Engineer for 1879:—

“It will be seen that much yet remains to be discovered respecting large areas, and it is this information which I suggest should be obtained in the coming season by careful explorations of the sections where our knowledge is deficient.

“During last session of Parliament I was called upon to express my views with regard to the question of a terminus on the Pacific coast, and the location of the western end of the line. I submitted the opinion that it would be desirable to gain full and complete information regarding a northern route by Peace or Pine River, and the vast territory through which a northern route has been proposed, with respect to which little is now known. The Government, however, deemed it essential that construction should commence without further delay in British Columbia, and I was directed to state the route, which, under the circumstances, I would advise should be placed under contract. Accordingly I recommended that if no postponement for further examination could be admitted, and if the immediate commencement of the railway was imperative, that the choice should fall on the route by the Rivers Thompson and Fraser to Burrard Inlet. It cannot be said that the selection of Burrard Inlet as a terminus has given general

satisfaction in British Columbia. On the contrary, a claim has been advanced in the Province that another route and terminus are preferable. It is therefore to be considered if additional explorations should be made, and more complete information obtained with regard to the northern country."

A persistency in the present policy under the circumstances would therefore seem to forebode, in the near future, either the suspension of the works from the impossibility of realizing sufficiently from the sale of the public lands, or the imposition of intolerable burdens to meet the heavy outlays; under which the finances of the country would become disorganized, and its onward march be arrested.

Construction through the Prairie region, on an economical scale, with the view of meeting the requirements of colonization, and with the proceeds of land sales, would probably have been the true policy to have adopted, consistent with the resources of the country.

As against the present policy—defective on Imperial and National grounds—General Hewson recommends a location from Quebec through Norway House and the Peace River Pass to Portland Inlet, on the Pacific, and the verification of this route under the American system of cross section surveys, which will bring out all the information required at a later period for construction and colonization purposes; and if this route proves to be practicable—and all the facts so far brought to light lead up to this conclusion—the construction of a purely colonization railway, adapted to present requirements and to the financial means of the Dominion. On these two points the General expresses himself as follows:—

"It is proposed here that 'explorations,' whether topographical or botanical, on special routes for the Canadian Pacific shall be stopped. Instrumentation, whether on

trial, or on location, involves, when made in advance of the general knowledge of the country, a still more costly waste. 'Section' line surveys—at intervals of a mile apart—are hardly necessary for guiding the determination of the proper route of the Pacific Railway; for 'Township' line surveys—at intervals of six miles apart—will probably be found sufficient. The 'Township' lines having supplied the facts, agricultural and physical, somewhat generally, it might be found necessary, subsequently, to fill the intervals at some places with 'section' lines so as to obtain these facts in specification. But, be the details in which the work may be carried out whatever experience shall demand, every dollar spent on it would be spent on a result of permanence, on a very necessity which must be met sooner or later, as a basis agricultural settlement."

"The Canadian Pacific Railway should not cost, at first, a dollar more than necessary to make it passable by trains. Interest kept down thus, the opening should take place as soon as possible, so as to begin the process of developing business. Running through a country perfectly new, it will not require at the outset the class of works proper to great traffic. The bridge piers are, in truth, the only constructions that demand permanence. Its road bed high, well drained and well cross tied, it can dispense, as long as necessary, with or last, fences, cattle guards, road crossings. Except at such places as the intersection of rivers, station buildings will not be necessary. A colonization road, whose object, at first, is that of simply opening up the country for settlement, it may resort freely to undulating grades, sharp curves, wooden bridges, and almost unbroken stretches of single track embankment. Rock work, deep cuts, high embankments, etc., being all avoided by, where unavoidable otherwise, substitutions of one sort, or another, the road and rolling stock ought not to cost for the purpose of opening for traffic, between Quebec and Peace River

Pass, more than \$15,000 or \$16,000 per mile. And subsequent addition of ballast, substitution of trestling by filling, replacement of undulating gradients by heavy work, &c., be made in employment of idle rolling stock—made by degrees at the charge of revenue, and in the continued production of revenue, by a system of labour associated with the encouragement of settlement."

The people of Canada have undertaken the construction of their National Railway with the view, not of benefitting particular localities and classes of the community, but of, by fostering inter-Provincial trade relations, gradually moulding the several Provinces of the Dominion into a homogenous nation. On no other grounds could this gigantic undertaking have been justified. The utmost care should therefore be taken not to imperil the great ends in view in the execution of this work. A defective location which would ignore the interests, and deprive the Eastern Provinces of the carrying trade; the diversion of the traffic of the road at Pembina and Thunder Bay into American channels; the break in the continuity of the line between the head of Lake Superior and Lake Nipissing, prolonged indefinitely; and, finally, the imposition of intolerable burdens, consequent upon unwarrantable outlays, would most probably result in the violent rending asunder of the frail bond which now unites the several Provinces of this Dominion.

That our national highway has been conceived in a somewhat narrow and selfish spirit; that its location has been, to a serious extent, controlled by local influences, groups of population around Georgian Bay, in Manitoba, and at Vancouver, having to be conciliated, regardless of future consequences; and that a mode of construction has been commenced unwarranted by the requirements of the case, appear to have been fairly demonstrated.

Fortunately, however, the country is not too far committed to revise the present policy if need there be.

General Hewson claims to have indicated the policy which should be at once adopted, and carried out with vigour, to realize the great ends in view. The issues which he has raised, more especially as they appear to involve such an astonishing difference in point of expenditure, should be met, otherwise they may prove to be an insurmountable barrier to any negotiations in the London money market.

Under the circumstances, the duty of the Government, unless indeed they are in the possession of a breadth of facts which justify another course, would appear to be: 1st. To stop any further outlays on the present location, with the exception, however, of the works between Thunder Bay and Selkirk, now well advanced towards completion; 2nd. Not to close the British Columbia contracts, nor any others, before the meeting of Parliament (an administrative act which could not be defended, and would expose the Cabinet to accusations of a damaging character.) And 3rd. To revise the present system of construction.

Should the Government find themselves being impelled on a course against which their better judgment demurs, let them take Parliament into their confidence; their hands will be strengthened, and a policy will be matured and be imposed, such as is required in the furtherance of the best interests of the whole country.

The course of events so far goes to prove, as the General says, that the time has in all probability arrived when the execution of this great work should be removed from the political arena and be entrusted to an Imperial and Canadian Commission. In the adoption of this course alone can local influences be silenced, the reputation of our public men be guarded against the dangers surrounding

the expenditures of millions, the independence of Parliament and of the electoral body be preserved, and finally the great ends to be worked out by this railway be fully realized.

It has been objected by some, that, as a considerable portion of the present location is under contract, it is now too late to discuss the question of changing the line. An esteemed correspondent, in our issue of yesterday, while admitting the excellence of General Hewson's scheme, takes this view. But, if the General's figures, from which the following may be deduced, should prove to bear any semblance to correctness, not only is this not the case; but, even after adding the cost of works now under construction to the total probable cost of his scheme, the balance against the carrying out of the Government policy is something alarming. To illustrate what we mean, and what the General pretends, we give the following figures, which may prove to be only the roughest approximation of the reality, but which, nevertheless, are sufficiently startling to demand a thorough investigation into the subject:—

APPROXIMATE COST, PRESENT LOCATION.

	Miles.	
Ottawa to Lake Nipissing (subsidy).. }	800	\$ 1,500,000
Lake Nipissing to Fort William..... }		36,000,000
Fort William to Red River.....	410	20,000,000
Red River to Rocky Mountains.....	1043	20,000,000
Rocky Mountains to Burrard Inlet.....	493	50,000,000
Pacific to Ottawa.....	2746	\$ 127,500,000

PROBABLE APPROXIMATE COST, HEWSON'S LINE.

	Miles.	
Quebec to Norway House... }	2460	at \$16,000 \$40,000,000
N'way House to Peace River. }		
Peace River to the Pacific.....	300	say 20,000,000
Pacific to Quebec.....	2760	\$60,000,000

ADD

	Miles.	
Branch, James' Bay to Mattawa.....	350	\$ 7,000,000
Ottawa to Mattawa, (under construction)..		1,500,000
Fort William to Red River (under construction).....		20,000,000
		<hr/>
		\$88,500,000
In favor of Hewson's scheme after adding the cost of work under contract.....		<hr/>
		\$39,000,000

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ARTICLE IV.

The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Eastern Provinces.

The conclusions we have come to, after a careful consideration of the issues raised by General Hewson, in his pamphlet, and lectures before the Literary and Historical Society and Board of Trade of this city, with reference to our National Railway, may be summed up as follows :— That a cardinal error has been committed in the location of the road, and in the style of construction adopted—that the Cabinets of the day are guided by no fixed principles in its construction—that the time has arrived to recast our whole policy in reference thereto—and finally, that with the Eastern Provinces more immediately rests the duty of formulating and of improving this policy.

In years gone by the great ends to be worked out by this trunk line were heralded forth in glowing terms in Parliament, in the Press, and before the people ; the creation of an Imperial military road across the Continent, entirely through British territory ; the opening up of our immense back country between the Atlantic and the Pacific ; the gradual moulding of the various Provinces of the Dominion into a strong and united people.

It was with many misgivings, after much hesitation, and only upon repeated assurances, that the works would be carried on without the imposition of additional taxation, that the people finally gave their assent to the project.

What are the results before us to-day ?

Some \$5,000,000 recklessly squandered in surveys which, the Chief Engineer admits, still leave us with a knowledge of the country very imperfect for construction purposes, and utterly worthless for the purposes of realizing upon our lands; and a location defective in every particular. Can anything be more useless from an Imperial point of view than a line of communication open to capture along the shores of Lake Superior, and from one to two days' march from the frontier for hundreds of miles westward from Fort William? Can anything be more suicidal from a National point of view than the location of a great trunk line on the extreme Southern border instead of through the centre of our back country, which would bring all parts into play with the least future outlay for side lines, and which furthermore completely ignores the interests of the Eastern Provinces? Can anything be more profoundly discouraging from a commercial point of view than the building, and future working, of some 2,200 miles of railway—out of a total mileage of 2,700 miles—through such an inhospitable, formidable, and uninhabitable country as the region between Lake Nipissing and Red River, the American Desert, which extends some hundreds of miles into the Canadian Prairie Region, and from Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet in British Columbia have been described—rocky and barren, bristling with tremendous mountains and fearful precipices, and offering no fields for settlement.

That an outlay of some \$130,000,000—which by final completion will most likely have reached up to \$150,000,000—is beyond the strength of the country; and that an average cost of construction of fully \$50,000 per mile of road is unwarranted by the requirements of a railway, which in the first instance should be built as a colonization road, to be improved as settlement sets in and as its traffic develops, must be evident to every average intelligent person. This comes out with more force when it is stated

that there are not at this moment one hundred thousand souls located in this immense territory stretching from Lake Nipissing to the Pacific. How is this enormous sum of \$130,000,000 to be raised? So far some \$12,000,000 have been spent in surveys and on construction from Thunder Bay to Selkirk, and from Winnipeg to Pembina, which have been raised by loan. Is the balance to be so raised, say at an average of \$10,000,000 a year? Is this possible without bringing on a financial disaster? How much, over and above the amount which will be required to meet the annual interest on capital, will there be needed to keep the road in operation through such an extent of unsettled country, and which for the four-fifths of its extent is unfit for settlement? The Parliamentary returns show a loss of \$500,000 as the result of last year's operations on the Intercolonial Railway under infinitely more favorable conditions. Say that our 4,000,000 will have expanded to 6,000,000 of souls ten years hence, will any one seriously contend, that this increase of population would warrant the building and working of a railway under such circumstances? Or are we destined to see a suspension of the works a few years hence, and then find ourselves on the one hand with an outlay of some \$40,000,000 or \$50,000,000 of capital, and on the other with two or three disconnected sections of our famous Pacific Railway—of no practical use from a national point of view—one between Thunder Bay and Red River—a second in the Prairie Region—a third in a central portion of British Columbia.

The absence of a well-matured policy, and of fixed principles, in the building of the road, may be seen from the following facts: Originally the line West of Red River had been located from Winnipeg by the South of Lake Manitoba. During the Mackenzie Administration this location had been changed to Selkirk up the Swan District and North of Lake Manitoba. For the third time the

location has been altered and brought back to the original site. AND THIS IN THE FACE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHIEF ENGINEER TO THE ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE, THAT THE CHANGE TO THE SWAN DISTRICT HAD BEEN MADE AS THE RESULTS OF YEARS OF LABORIOUS SURVEYS AND STUDIES, AND AFTER THE QUESTION HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY VENTILATED BEFORE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE DURING OVER A YEAR. The reader is referred to Vol. 9—1877-78—Reports and Proceedings Royal Colonial Institute. Again the Minister of Railways, it appears, has been expressing himself of late as favorable either to the building, or subsidizing, by the Dominion of a line of railway from Lake Nipissing to Sault Saint Marie. Is not this an open avowal of the practical abandonment of the *connecting link* between Thunder Bay and Lake Nipissing, and in reality moving the Eastern terminus up to the head of Lake Superior? What then becomes of our great national railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific entirely through Canadian territory? It is clear to-day, that if the railway is ever built Westward from Lake Nipissing it will be carried up North and practically take the Hewson route, but with this essential difference—as the General says—that it will reach tide water over the two sides of the triangle instead of direct over its base.

And the administrative capacity presiding over the construction of the road may be judged from the following, among facts too numerous to detail: The Parliamentary reports reveal the astonishing facts, that there were no surveys, no location, no exact information in the hands of the Cabinet of the day when the country was committed to the building of the road between Thunder Bay and Selkirk; that the contractors were upon the ground before the location was made and claimed damages accordingly.

And this in a matter involving an outlay of \$20,000,000. Again on the face of the printed forms of tender for the Yale-Kamloops sections, in British Columbia—just awarded, there appears a most ominous foot note which purports that portions of the quantities of work set forth are only rough approximations, and others simply conjectures. And this in a matter involving an outlay of \$14,000,000. Was ever such a field opened up to contractors and engineers to fleece the country! Was ever such recklessness exhibited! And that contracts of such a nature and magnitude should have been entered into within two months of the sitting of Parliament is simply incredible. Surely if the Cabinet have really committed themselves to such a wild policy, which we do not believe to be the case notwithstanding what is said in the press, Parliament, as the supreme guardian of the public interests, will withhold its sanction. Surely party ties will not carry our public men so far as to betray the great trust reposed in them.

The time has arrived indeed to revise our policy in connection with our National Railway if it is to be rescued from the baneful effects of local and political influences.

Interested parties inside and outside of Parliament, and they are legion, will attempt to deceive the country by raising the objection, that it is now too late to retrace our steps, and to adopt a new location. Nothing can be more contrary to truth. The works of construction on the present location, as has already been explained, consist of simply the section from Thunder Bay to Selkirk, and of a second section of 100 miles westward from Winnipeg, upon which latter but little work has as yet been done. General Hewson has shown that the \$20,000,000 involved in the Thunder Bay, Selkirk section constitute no good reason for sinking a further sum of \$100,000,000 in the carrying of this defective location to final completion; and more particularly as the Thunder Bay, Selkirk section will serve

a separate and immediate interest, the opening up of Manitoba, and the surrounding country. It is therefore evident that the way is open for the adoption of a more favorable route if one can be found for our Canadian Pacific Railway. General Hewson has indicated to us this better location from Dean Inlet by the Peace River Pass, Norway House, Moose River, and over the head waters of the Saint Maurice to Quebec: and he cites his authorities, which go to prove, that the country from Lake Mistassini to Norway House, in point of soil, produce, and climate, is fully equal to the country on this side of the Laurentian Range: and that the great fertile belt stretches from Norway House to the Peace River Pass in the Rocky Mountains. The authorities cited are all official and for the most part the same as those upon which Sandford Fleming rests his knowledge of the country. The position of the two routes would be roughly as follows:—

	Miles.	Good Soil.	Poor Soil.	Light Work.	Heavy Work.
Burrard Inlet.....	3,015	500	2,150	1,000	1,650
Dean Inlet	2,700	2,150	470	2,300	320

Through this country may be built an Imperial Military road across the continent, entirely through Canadian territory, far retired from the frontier, and available at all seasons of the year. Through this country may be built a great national trunk line which will open up to settlement the interior of our immense back country and preserve within ourselves our future colossal carrying trade, making of Montreal and Quebec our summer, and of St. Andrews, St. John and Halifax our winter termini on the Atlantic. Through this country—offering great topographical facilities for the building of a railway, and likewise an unbounded field for settlement from Quebec to the Rocky Mountains—may be built a railway with a reasonable outlay of capital, and with fair prospects for its future working.

The people of Canada find themselves face to face with issues of the most vital importance. The policy pursued up to this date by successive governments is condemned in its very essence, and nevertheless in this policy is involved the future welfare of the Dominion. Shall these issues be answered, or shall they be silently passed over? Shall the Hewson route be tested or shall it be rejected without examination? And shall the Hewson route be adopted if it be found to be what it has been described, or shall local influences and sectional jealousies fatally control this national work to the end regardless of all feelings of justice, and future consequences? It is for the people of Canada to decide. *But there is one thing, which fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, does not lie within the province of either the Cabinet, Parliament or the people of Canada to decide, and that is whether the money shall be forthcoming to build the road. The funds must be obtained in the English money market either as the direct product of land sales, or as borrowed capital. It is as well to realize at once, that the money will not be forthcoming if the issues raised by General Hewson have not been fairly met and satisfactorily answered.*

It is not to be expected, that Manitoba, the North-West Territories and British Columbia will move in the matter. Ontario even is not so immediately interested. But with Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island rests the urgent duty of insisting upon the adoption of a policy in connection with this national highway which will secure the working out of the great ends in view. Should the present location be persisted in, and should the works be carried to completion, the Eastern Provinces will, on the one hand, be called upon to shoulder intolerable burdens, whilst on the other hand they will not receive the carrying trade of the road, which for the most part will find its way to American ports.

That the political world, and its immediate surroundings, may be quite satisfied with the present policy, which furnishes a convenient cloak to screen from the public eye the enormous expenditures which are being made at various points to purchase political existence, may be likely enough. But with the country it is very different indeed; a cardinal error in a matter involving millions will entail consequences of a most disastrous character, which will continue to be felt by the people long after its perpetrators will have disappeared from the scene.

Let then the representatives of the Eastern Provinces proceed to Ottawa with the firm determination to insist upon—1st. The suspension of the works upon the present location with the exception of the Thunder Bay, Selkirk section. 2nd. The closing of no further contracts for the present, or if any have been entered into their annulment. 3rd. The adoption of a class of works of construction in keeping with the requirements of the road and the finances of the country; and 4th. The immediate verification of the Hewson route, which can be completed within twelve months, and at an outlay of under \$100,000. Either the route will be pronounced to be impracticable, and in this case the public mind will be set at rest on this all essential point; or it will be found to be feasible, and in this case it will force itself upon the honesty and sense of justice of the country. Most assuredly never would an investment of \$100,000 have been more wisely made. But the task of making this verification of the Hewson route must be confided to an Imperial engineer—one entirely beyond the control of the Government. The experience of the past, even in the instance of this very railway, has shown us how the Government engineers have been influenced by political pressure; nothing less will satisfy the people of the country.

And in the event of the adoption of the Hewson location, and the removal of this national work from the political arena to the safe guard of a joint Imperial and Canadian Commission, then indeed may Imperial co-operation be earnestly solicited, and with confidence—a matter of vital importance when it is considered, that \$130,000,000 are at stake. The Imperial interests in the Pacific Ocean make of British Columbia a strategical position of the first-class, and of this railway a matter of necessity as a line of communication thereto. \$20,000,000 were invested to procure the control of the Suez Canal : a similar sum—nay \$40,000,000—in this case would be, to say the least, an equally good investment. And this co-operation cannot, and will not, be refused unless indeed England voluntarily abdicating her high estate, openly declines her fair share of the responsibilities involved in the consolidation of her vast empire, and avows her utter indifference as to whether, or not, her surplus population shall go forth to build up foreign and hostile nations.

ARTICLE V.

THE LOCATION.

The first condition to the future successful working of a railway is a location through a country capable of yielding traffic. From the following brief description it will be seen at a glance how fatally defective is the location of our national railway in this particular :

The country through which the railway will pass has been broadly designated into three great regions—the Woodland, the Prairie and the Mountainous. The first is comprised between Lake Nipissing and Red River, the second between Red River and the Rocky Mountains, the third between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.

From Lake Nipissing to Thunder Bay, a distance of over 600 miles to the immediate north of Lake Superior, the country is of a most forbidding character and unfit for settlement. For years the Government Engineers have been endeavoring to find a reasonably feasible route through it, but so far without success. From Thunder Bay to the Red River, a distance of over 400 miles, the country is but very little better, in great part covered with rocks and water. We have thus a location of over 1,000 miles through an uninhabitable country in the Woodland region.

Between Red River and the Rocky Mountains, we find the American Desert extending into Canada on a breadth of some 500 miles, and the location is through this desert, which is absolutely wanting in timber and water. It is stated that Colonel Denis, the Surveyor-General, has reported on these facts. Captain Butler says settlement in this territory will be attended with disastrous consequences ; and Marcus Smith, confirming this, furthermore

adds, that the mass of the fertile lands lie far to the north in the Peace River District. We thus have a location of 500 miles through an uninhabitable country in the Prairie region.

From Yellow Head Pass to the Pacific stretches the enormous barren mass of the Rocky Mountains, rent asunder here and there by fearful chasms, and terminating abruptly in the sea. The location, having surmounted this formidable barrier at an elevation of 4,000 feet, winds its gloomy way to the sea through and along the sides of these mountains which overhang the waters roaring beneath in the canons of the Thompson and Fraser Rivers. The desolate character of this territory may be taken in at a glance when it is stated, that according to Marcus Smith, there are not 10,000 acres of arable lands along the entire route. We thus have a location of 500 miles through an uninhabitable country in the Mountainous region.

From the present location we therefore deduce the following facts:—1st, that our national railway will be carried for over 2,000 through a country which cannot by any possibility yield traffic for its sustenance after construction; and 2nd, that the Eastern Terminus is in truth fixed at the head of Lake Superior, at Thunder Bay, which virtually will hand over the traffic of the road exclusively to the American railways in winter, and to American ships equally with our own in summer. The connecting link between Thunder Bay and Lake Nipissing is a thing in the far distant future, as may be inferred from the immediate construction of a line from Lake Nipissing to Sault Saint Marie, which has been fore-shadowed by Sir Charles Tupper in his late speeches.

Truly may the country in general, and the Eastern Provinces in particular, find matter for deep and anxious reflection in this location, and more particularly when it is considered, that upon it is based an outlay of \$130,000,000 of capital.

ARTICLE VI.

THE COST OF CONSTRUCTION.

The second condition to the future successful working of a railway is an outlay of capital in keeping with the requirements of the road. From the following it will be seen at a glance, how fatally defective has been the policy in this particular since the inception of this great national scheme.

The total cost of construction we work out as under.

The section from Thunder Bay—at the head of Lake Superior to Selkirk on the Red River, Sandford Fleming admits, at page 22 of his report for 1879—will cost \$44,000 per mile “as far as it can now be ascertained.” The original estimates having been exceeded in execution by 52 per cent—a fact brought out by Senator Macpherson—we are fully warranted in setting down the final average of this section at \$50,000 at least. The tenders lately received for the four sections, 125 miles in length, from Yale to Kamloops in British Columbia, exceed \$80,000 per mile, exclusive of rails, rolling stock, engineering, &c., &c.,—simply for the road bed. A foot note at the bottom of the printed form, purports, that part of the quantities set forth are only rough approximations, part simply conjectures. On the face of the tender the Government openly admit their complete ignorance of the nature and extent of the works for which they call for tenders—and also, that the country is to be handed over to contractors and engineers, who will, at a later day, settle amicably among themselves what shall be the true cost of this precious

piece of business, if indeed it ever be undertaken. Should the original estimates in this case be overstepped in course of execution, in the same ratio as in the case of the Thunder Bay-Selkirk section, the final average per mile for these 125 miles would reach over \$150,000 per mile. We may, therefore, with perfect safety, fix an average of \$100,000 per mile for the section from Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet. Estimates have been figured up, ranging from \$30,000 to \$90,000 per mile for the section from Thunder Bay to Lake Nipissing. As this country is far more difficult than the country from the head of Lake Superior to the Red River, and as the Government have recoiled from this task, a final average of \$70,000 per mile for this section will certainly be found to be within the truth should it ever be built. Construction from Red River to the Rocky Mountains through the Prairie Region, we will establish at the moderate figure of say \$20,000 per mile, which again we may observe will turn out to be under the mark in practice.

We sum up :

Lake Nipissing to Thunder Bay 630 miles, at \$70,000 per mile.....	\$ 44,100,000
Thunder Bay to Selkirk, 410 miles, at \$50,000 per mile.....	20,500,000
Selkirk to Yellow Head Pass, 1,043 miles, at \$20,000 per mile.....	20,860,000
Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet, 493 miles, at \$100,000 per mile.....	49,300,000
Total.....	<u>\$ 134,760,000</u>

That these \$134,760,000 will swell up to \$150,000,000 by final completion is very likely indeed, judging from past experience.

Now, when it is considered:—1st. That this railway is to be built through well nigh two thousand miles of an

almost uninhabitable country, as explained in our article entitled "The Location." 2nd. That at this moment there are not 100,000 souls living in the immense territory stretching from Lake Nipissing to the Pacific, and that this vast region cannot be settled up to any appreciable extent within the next twenty years—and 3rd. That under these circumstances the railway should, of necessity, be constructed as a colonization road, to be improved as its traffic develops, and not as a great trunk line through an old, densely populated, and wealthy country like England, it will be evident to every impartial mind, that capital is being recklessly and uselessly squandered on construction, and that the finances of the country are being imperiled. The secret to success in business is the application of the least amount of capital to produce a given result. How many great projects have been hopelessly over-weighted by lavish and uncalled for outlays of capital; and in no field has this been exemplified to the same extent as in railway enterprise, a point alluded to in the Chief Engineer's report for 1879.

The people of the Dominion in general, and of the Eastern Provinces in particular, will do well, ere it be too late, to examine closely into the policy governing this great work, a policy under which their best interests are being so completely ignored, and upon which is based an outlay of over \$130,000,000.

ARTICLE VII.

THE FUTURE WORKING.

Having briefly reviewed the location and cost of construction of our national railway, we will now add a few words with reference to its future working. If the building of some 2,700 miles of road—from the Pacific to Lake Nipissing—at an average cost of \$50,000 per mile, through well nigh 2,000 miles of an almost uninhabitable country—1,000 in the woodland, 500 in the prairie, and 500 in the mountainous regions—be subject matter for reflection to serious minds, equally so must be the future working of this long and costly road. And more especially when it is considered that this colossal enterprise is to be undertaken by a people of 4,000,000, distant from 1,000 to 2,000 miles from the seat of these vast expenditures. How are these 2,700 miles to be operated through such an immense extent of lands which will never be colonized, and which will never develop traffic to any appreciable extent? How many years will it take to throw in—in the parts fit for settlement—a population which would warrant the construction of such a line? Will a quarter of a century see such a flow of emigration? At present there are not one hundred thousand souls living in this territory. The working expenses—including maintenance—of the fourteen railway lines of the Dominion for 1876 was \$3,705 per mile. The working expenses of the Canadian Pacific Railway, therefore, for the limited number of but two trains each way per day, may be stated at least at \$2,200 per mile—or \$5,940,000 per annum. The reasonableness of the above estimate will be seen from the following facts. The cost

of running trains is generally estimated in round numbers at \$1 per train mile—and maintenance at \$1,000 per mile, this last a very low figure.

The annual outlay in connection with our national railway may therefore be roughly summed up as follows:—

Interest at 5 per cent on \$130,000,000	\$ 6,500,000
Running expenses two trains each way—2,700	
miles x 4 trains x 300 working days.....	3,240,000
Maintenance 2,700 miles at \$1,000 per mile.....	2,700,000
	<hr/>
	\$12,440,000

verily a formidable addition to the volume of our present annual expenditure.

Well may the people of Canada in general—and of the Eastern Provinces in particular—ask themselves whether \$130,000,000 shall be spent in building our national railway under the present policy which so fatally ignores, in location and outlay of capital, the essential conditions to its future successful working. Well may they ask themselves what they are to receive in return for such a venture to assist them in supporting the heavy burdens already looming up in the near future. Certainly it will not be the traffic of the road which, at Pembina, and at Duluth, by means of a direct line with Winnipeg, as well as with Thunder Bay, will, for the most part, by the force of attraction of the American ports, find its way into American channels.

A truly national line passing far in the interior, and throughout its length in a country fit for settlement, preserving within the country, beyond the reach of our grasping and all-powerful neighbours, the benefits of its future colossal traffic, and discharging the same at Montreal and Quebec in summer, and at Halifax, Saint John and Saint Andrews in winter; a line which, by fostering and

developing trade relations between the Atlantic, the Central and the Pacific Provinces, would have bound these firmly together by a community of interests, would indeed have been a return commensurate with this venture.

The country will willingly assent to construction upon a proper location through the prairie region, which can be done at a moderate cost and with immediate returns. But the country cannot, and will not, consent to the wanton wasting of \$100,000,000 on construction at fabulous prices, ranging from \$70,000 to \$100,000 per mile, through the barren rocky country north of Lake Superior and through the desolate mountains and gloomy cañons of the Thompson and Fraser rivers in British Columbia. Bitterly must the country regret to-day the \$20,000,000, which are being sunk between Red River and Thunder Bay, a section of 410 miles, passing through a country unfit for settlement—which can only be worked six months in the year—and which from the almost certainty of a direct line being built before long between Winnipeg and Duluth, over a level and easy country—bids fair to be of no earthly use to the country.

An obstinate persistence in such mad expenditures will inevitably lead to an irredeemable currency to replenish an exhausted Treasury, under which the public and private fortune will wither. A few years ago our neighbours across the line gave us this spectacle—gold reached over 300 per cent. premium—and the consequent derangement in values resulting from the depreciation of the Government paper—which followed in the ratio of the expansion of its volume—convulsed society to its very foundations, spreading ruin and dismay through all classes. In their case, however, our cousins could plead the dire necessities of a civil war, waged to uphold the national unity. But were such a calamity to overtake and overwhelm us, we would

have no great cause to cheer up our drooping spirits and to brace our failing energies. It would have been the work of our public men, and their surroundings, done with cool deliberation, the former struggling to grasp empty titles and to reach or retain the sweets of office, the latter to amass colossal fortunes out of the very life-blood of their fellow-countrymen. And let us not flatter ourselves that our resuscitation from such a disaster would be as rapid as with our neighbours—we have neither the same breadth of population, soil, climate or resources.

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ARTICLE VIII.

The Yale Kamloops Contracts

We take the following extract from the Speech from the Throne, read on Thursday last, at the opening of Parliament:—

“After an exploratory survey of the line from Port Simpson to the Pine River pass, and through the Peace River country, it has been decided to adopt the location of the line to Burrard Inlet, and contracts have been awarded for one hundred and twenty-seven miles of railway between Emery’s Bar on the Fraser River and Savona’s ferry. This work will be vigorously proceeded with so soon as the spring opens; its construction will complete the most difficult portion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and secure the connection by steam of the fertile district of Kamloops with the capital of British Columbia.”

So then, the Government have announced their determination to call upon Parliament to commit the country to unknown expenditures in the construction of 500 miles of railway from Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet through British Columbia. Disguise the fact as they may, the building of the Yale Kamloops section entails the obligation of completion westward to the sea—eastward through the Rocky Mountains. They have determined that fifty millions—so far as we can see to-day—shall be wrung from Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces in this attempt, whilst these Provinces—crippled in means—are unable to develop the resources lying idle at their own doors from the want of cheap means of transport. They have deter-

mined that 4,000,000 of people shall submit—although it may be at the peril of the public fortune—to the threat of British Columbia to secede from the Union. They have decided that Canada shall carry out with her feeble resources a work which should be executed with Imperial funds.

And upon what information have the Government determined to call upon Parliament to sanction the policy involved in these sections, which show an average cost of over \$100,000 per mile? Upon the face of the tender appears a note which says: that part of the quantities are rough approximations, part simply conjectures. The Government and their Engineer avow openly their ignorance of the nature, extent, and cost of the work to which they are asking Parliament to commit the country. The tender is open to challenge; either it is a bulk sum contract, or an item contract; if a bulk sum no honest and wealthy contractors can be found to risk their fortunes on such incomplete data; if an item contract then the country is to be handed over, bound hand and foot, to the tender cares of contractors and Engineers before whom opens up a boundless field to fleece the unfortunate tax-payers of the Dominion. No man knows—nor can pretend to know—to-day what will be the cost of the road through British Columbia. Let not Mr. Fleming give us any more of his assurances, and estimates; in the words of Sir John we declare “his usefulness is gone.” The value of his opinions and figures have been exposed of late, and by none in more energetic terms than by the *Montreal Gazette*; and useless they are indeed, having been shown to have been exceeded in practice by from 50 to 100 per cent. The truth appears to be that Mr. Fleming considers money of no account, although it is cheap railroad building that has so wonderfully developed the Western States.

It is impossible to believe that party ties and interested motives will so far control Parliament as to secure a blind acceptance of such legislation. It is impossible that our public men—and the press—can have already been enslaved by the corrupting influence of the enormous expenditures impending over the country. Surely the madness of attempting railroad building, at a cost which will perhaps reach up to \$150,000 per mile, through a country presenting such tremendous topographical and engineering difficulties—such very limited areas fit for settlement—and with but a nominal population—some 10,000 white people—must strike every tax-payer with dismay

We notice that the Government, in justification of the position taken in the Burrard Inlet location, have armed themselves with a report on the Peace River District; but this is too thin to go down with the public—the work was undertaken with a foregone conclusion. And if Mr. Fleming after having, in 1874, condemned Burrard Inlet, has gone back upon himself; if after having condemned the location westward from Red River, south of Lake Manitoba, and after having secured the location north of Lake Manitoba through the Swan District, has again gone back upon himself through *political pressure*, is it not trifling with the country, in a matter of the utmost gravity, to hold up before Parliament the opinions of subordinate engineers—almost unknown professionals? The country will accept nothing short of an opinion from an Imperial engineer, or of a professional gentleman entirely beyond their control.

It would appear that the reports and maps of the Assistant-Engineer, Mr. Marcus Smith, called for during the last session, were carefully suppressed by Mr. Fleming.

Mr. Smith, since the first, has been the field engineer and it is admitted that no man possesses the same breadth of information as himself. We ask that these maps and reports be produced forthwith. We ask that Mr. Smith be called before the House to give his view to the country on this all-important question involving millions and millions. We are entitled to this information and must have it; it cannot have been kept back for any good motive.

It is true Parliament has the power to so far forget its duty, as supreme guardian of the public interest, as to commit the people of Canada to this suicidal policy; the press so far have been very reticent, and the people to-day have no voice in the matter. But we feel confident that Parliament, weighing maturely the consequences of this policy, represented in millions to be sunk to no practical purposes, will not commit the country to this construction until Imperial co-operation has been secured, as affirmed in the Canada Pacific Railway Resolutions adopted during last session. We call upon Parliament to stand firm by this policy: Either Imperial co-operation in the building of this Imperial and Canadian highway, or no construction in British Columbia,—the task is beyond our strength.

ARTICLE IX.

Imperial and Canadian Railway Responsibilities.

Having—in a review of the policy, which has been followed by successive governments, up to this day, in the building of our national railway—condemned the location as radically defective, and the cost of construction as ruinously extravagant; having pointed out, that if this course be persisted in, it may eventually lead to the disruption of the Union: and having urged the necessity of re-considering our policy with reference to this great work—it may not perhaps be out of place, now, to sketch briefly the new departure we conceive to be called for under the present circumstances.

That we have reached a crisis is evident; if Parliament sanctions the Yale Kamloops contracts the country will be irrevocably committed to construction through British Columbia—to an outlay of over fifty millions: the importance therefore of weighing most carefully, the consequences of this step cannot be over-estimated.

Canada stands committed—it is true—to the building of this railway by the Act admitting British Columbia into the Confederation, and also by the Carnarvon terms: but subject to the general understanding—reiterated on several occasions in the House of Commons—that the railway shall be built without entailing the necessity of increasing the rate of taxation on the country.

Twenty-five millions are already involved, represented by over four millions for surveys, the balance for construction from Thunder Bay to Selkirk, Selkirk to Pembina, and one hundred miles westward from Selkirk.

The creation of an Imperial military road across the Continent through British territory—the settlement of our immense public domain—the moulding of the several Provinces of the Dominion into a strong and united people—were the considerations which induced the undertaking of this gigantic scheme.

A glance at the location will show that the ends in view cannot, and will not, be attained. A road open to capture along the shores of Lake Superior—for hundreds of miles along the frontier westward from Thunder Bay—and commanded at its outlet on the Pacific by the Fort of San Juan, will never receive Imperial assistance. A location through well nigh two thousand miles of an almost uninhabitable country will never develop, in a satisfactory manner, the mass of the arable lands of our public domain. The break in the line between Thunder Bay and Lake Nipissing—which, virtually, will hand over the traffic of the road to our neighbours—ignores the Eastern Provinces, and deprives them of any interest in the settlement of our North-West Territory. And that an average cost of over \$50,000 per mile, or a total outlay of over \$130,000,000, is beyond the financial strength of the country—is of a nature to impair the usefulness of the road—and is uncalled for under the circumstances—will be readily admitted by practical people.

What the people of Canada are willing to undertake is the construction of a colonization railway through a country fit for settlement, and on a location which will retain the traffic within the country.

Such a location has been suggested of late, from Quebec through the basin of James Bay to Norway House, and from thence to the Pacific through the Peace or Pine River Pass, 300 miles shorter than the present line, and estimated to cost many millions less.

This location, it is contended, will give a line suitable for military purposes, will pass through a country fit for settlement from Quebec to the Rocky Mountains, and will retain the traffic within the country, discharging it at Montreal and Quebec in summer, and at Halifax, St. John, and St. Andrew's in winter—thus uniting every Imperial and National requirement, and the elements to assure its future successful working.

Two parties are primarily interested in the building, and early completion, of the Canadian Pacific Railway—Canada and England.

The interests of Canada lie on this side of the Rocky Mountains, in the settlement of the fertile lands in the Prairie Region, computed as high as three hundred millions of acres. The Eastern Provinces are interested in the colonization of these lands as the bankers, manufacturers, and carriers of the millions who will find happy homes in this favored country: therefore will they support railway construction, on a proper location and on a sound financial basis, through the Prairie Region. But Canada has no such immediate interests in construction through British Columbia. It is evident to-day, that this Province will never develop any very great breadth of population and produce in consequence of the very limited areas of land suitable for cultivation. That there may be valuable minerals we will not deny. But, whether or not, whatever may be the yield of produce—from the forest, field and sea—this produce never can, nor never will, surmount the formidable barrier of the Rocky Mountains to travel over three thousand miles Eastward to find, through our Atlantic ports, an outlet to Europe—it will make its way direct by the Pacific, or more likely to San Francisco, the great American Pacific port. Why, therefore, should the people of Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces be called

upon to shoulder a burden of over fifty millions in a construction from which they can never derive any commensurate benefits—and more especially when they are unable to develop the resources lying idle at their own doors from the want of cheap means of transport !

The interests of England are twofold. The first, to facilitate to her surplus home population the access to a fertile country under her own sceptre. This easing of a redundant mass of people, living more or less in enforced idleness, is a matter of necessity to prevent civil commotions. England cannot profitably absorb her present population ; neither can she produce her requirements of food, nor live without foreign markets. Had a far-seeing policy guided this annual outflow during the last fifty years to her various colonies, how different might have been the position to-day. It is this outflow—in the main—which has built up the United States, but with what results—the creation of a great nation, which now not only shuts out her wares, but likewise invades her own markets. England can send us with advantage over fifty thousand hardy emigrants annually ; in ten years these—apart from continental immigration—will represent over a million. Statisticians will figure out the double gain to England in producers of her food supply, and purchasers of her manufactured goods. A boundless field is opened out to her in our North-West. The second—an interest more extended in its range and scope. England's Empire extends over the globe—her possessions are scattered through every sea. To her, therefore, military and naval stations, and coaling depots, at cardinal points, are of imperative necessity in order to keep open her lines of communication between all parts of the Empire. Without these England cannot hold her colonial possessions—and shorn of her colonial possessions England descends to the position of a third-rate power—nay her very existence becomes imperilled. Now if Gibraltar and

Malta in the Mediterranean, and Halifax and Bermuda in the Atlantic, are Imperial stations of vast importance, equally so must be Vancouver in the Pacific, from whence to guard her vast interests in this distant part of the world, and to watch over the United States and Russia, which latter power has advanced—within the last twenty years—eight hundred miles down the Asiatic coast, being now distant eight days by steam from Hong Kong and 15 from Vancouver. England has not a single naval station and dockyard in the Pacific: and her fleets operating in this vast sea are dependent on their base of operations situated thousands of miles away in the Channel Isles. But the United States have an arsenal at Mare's Island on the Pacific coast, and Russia likewise at Vladivostock—the former 7,000 miles and the latter 8,000 miles nearer Sydney than Plymouth. A military and naval station and coaling depot at Vancouver, therefore, becomes of pressing importance. Complications either with the States or Russia, in the present state of affairs, would take England at a sad disadvantage, and might, very possibly, cost her her possessions in the Pacific. And this railway from Halifax to Vancouver—entirely through British territory—as a means of access to this station likewise becomes of pressing importance, nay an imperative necessity.

Therefore, it is the bounden duty of England to co-operate, and on equal terms, with us in the immediate building of this Imperial and National highway. If \$20,000,000 were given without a dissentient voice to control the Suez Canal, well may \$50,000,000 be invested in this railway to secure the double interests at stake. England should not attempt to shirk her duties towards the Empire, and to impose upon us a task beyond our strength.

Parliament in the meantime should at least withhold its sanction to the Yale Kamloops contracts as prematurely

committing the country to construction through British Columbia. The people of this Province are at variance on the question of the location, some openly proclaiming the necessity of further study. The Government have no accurate detailed information as to the nature, extent and cost of the line from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific coast. The only figures before the country—in the Yale Kamloops sections—show an average cost of over \$100,000 per mile; and these figures are “rough approximations and simply conjectures” according to the Chief Engineer—in fact are worthless. What if, after the country has been committed, these estimates should be exceeded in execution by from 50 to 100 per cent. as in the case of the Thunder Bay Selkirk estimates!

Parliament should press upon the Home authorities the claims of this country to British co-operation in the construction of this Imperial and National highway; and proclaim the true intentions of the people of this country—Imperial co-operation with joint control—or no immediate construction through British Columbia. What chances can we have of obtaining Imperial assistance after the country has entered upon construction in British Columbia? If we realize to-day the rashness of having undertaken the building of this railway before having arranged with the Home authorities the basis of joint action in a matter of such colossal proportions—how fully should we appreciate on this occasion the imperative necessity of not again committing the country hastily in a matter involving an outlay of over fifty millions. The Premier has informed the House that negotiations on this subject are pending between the Imperial and Canadian authorities. Let then the Yale Kamloops contracts remain in abeyance until the issue of these negotiations.

Parliament should order further study of the several routes through British Columbia, and likewise the survey of the Hewson location—which latter work can be completed

within twelve months and at a cost of one hundred thousand dollars—pending the issue of the negotiations with the Home authorities. Surely it is incumbent upon those who represent the people to act with exceeding caution, and to reassure the public mind in questions of such importance.

And in the event of the final adoption of the Hewson route—as the result of the proposed test—we would suggest the following mode of construction, which will, in all probability, secure the building of our National Railway with the least cost to the country; construction from Quebec over the height of land, and westward through the basin of James' Bay by a private Company under a Dominion charter and subsidy; construction from Lake Nipissing up the Montreal and down the Abbittibi Rivers to, and westward through the basins of James and Hudson's Bays, likewise by a private Company under a Dominion charter and subsidy; construction through the Prairie Region to the Rocky Mountains—by the Marcus Smith location—also by a private Company under a Dominion charter and subsidy. There is no need of this work through the Prairie Region being a Government work; this can only lead to extravagant expenditure; the experience of the last few years is before us to confirm this statement. Under this policy, in time—these three sections being completed and connected—the country would find itself in the possession of its National Railway from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, and on the most favorable conditions possible: and Ontario and Quebec, the Provinces furnishing the funds, would at least receive some immediate return, for these immense expenditures, in the opening up of their own back country. Let construction through British Columbia be left with the Imperial authorities, unless indeed England agrees to the building of the entire line on joint and equal account—or be postponed until such time as Canada may be equal to the task.

ARTICLE X.

The Canadian Pacific Railway and British Columbia.

A crisis, of a most momentous character, has been brought on in connection with our National Railway by the premature and unjustifiable action of the Government in closing the Yale Kamloops contracts within a few weeks of the opening of Parliament. We say premature and unjustifiable—first, because these contracts have been entered into on very imperfect data, the Government and their Engineer, on the face of the tenders, admitting their ignorance of the nature, extent, and cost of these works—secondly, because the Chief Engineer had just previously sent in a report condemning the Burrard Inlet Route—and thirdly, because the conditions upon which Parliament had been led to grant its authorization to the signing of contracts for construction in British Columbia during the recess, have not been fulfilled. The time has therefore arrived when Parliament must take its stand, and define the policy which shall govern the construction of this national railway; any further drifting along with no fixed purpose will lead to unfortunate consequences in the near future.

Shall this stand be taken in the interests of this country, or shall it be in obedience to dictation from outside?

What is the position. On the one hand the Dominion is engaged in the building of a railway 2,700 miles long through a country, practically speaking, uninhabited—on a location fatally defective—and at a cost in keeping neither

with the finances of the country, nor with the requirements of the road. The public debt stands to-day in round figures at \$150,000,000, and will be doubled ere the completion of the road. The tariff has been raised 40 percent., and, nevertheless, the result of last year's operations shows a deficit of over \$2,000,000. The negotiations with the Home authorities for aid have failed so far, as likewise the syndicate which was to have taken up the lands reserved for the railway. The works of construction must therefore be carried on with loans. And anxiety and discontent are rapidly spreading through the country in consequence of the enormous expenditures impending in the West. On the other hand, British Columbia—under the menace of secession from the Union—demands the letter of the contract, the immediate commencement of an impossible task—construction through this Province at an outlay of over fifty millions.

The prosecution of the works on this railway, under existing circumstances, will necessitate within the next four years, say \$10,000,000 to complete the Thunder Bay section, \$10,000,000 in the Prairie Region, and over \$15,000,000 in the Yale Kamloops sections, or, with expenditures in other parts of the Dominion, a total outlay of over \$50,000,000. Our debt would then stand at \$200,000,000, a heavy load for a people of little over 4,000,000.

It would be imprudent to venture the assertion that, under any and the most favorable circumstances, the revenue will expand sufficiently to meet this increase in our indebtedness; and it is clear that we cannot rely upon meeting this outlay to any extent by sales of our public lands. Will not any further increase in the rate of taxation defeat the object in view and rather decrease the revenue? If the cost of living, already very high, be augmented, will it not result not only in shutting out immigration, but

likewise in driving our own people out of the country? Comparisons between the rates of taxation in Canada and in the United States, France and similar countries, are not sound. We have not the same resources; our climate and products are very limited, in range and extent. Moreover, we cannot expend all our means on this work; our various services, railways, canals, light-houses, steamers, &c., are expanding from year to year, as also the outlays on the same. And furthermore we cannot pretend to go on forever **DRAINING THE EASTERN PROVINCES TO MEET IMMENSE OUTLAYS IN THE FAR WEST AND ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS.** *These Provinces have likewise fair claims upon the Federal Treasury which it would not be prudent to persistently deny.*

Parliament has just received an authoritative warning not to commit the country hastily and prematurely to construction in British Columbia, and from no less a person than the Chief Engineer himself. Mr. Sanford Fleming, in a supplementary report, based on the result of the engineering operations of last summer in the Peace River district, and which was laid on the table of the House of Commons last week, expresses himself as follows. "*From what has been brought to light I would consider it unwise at this stage to adopt and begin construction on either the Burrard or Dean Inlet routes. While I would deem it prudent to defer a final decision with regard to the adoption of any route until we receive more definite information regarding some portions of the country now under examination, I have no hesitation in saying that, considered apart from the question of climate, the route to Port Simpson presents itself with so many advantages that to my mind it opens up an excellent prospect of securing the most eligible route from the Prairie Region to the Pacific Coast.*" Mr. Fleming further states "that Port Simpson is a safe and capacious harbour, perfectly easy of access to

Ocean steamers and sailing ships, night and day, and at all conditions of the tide," and he suggests that steps be taken to reserve the land in the neighbourhood. The mature and deliberate opinion and prudent recommendations of the Chief Engineer will surely meet with the hearty approval of Parliament when the gravity of the interests—the western terminus of this trans-continental railway, and an outlay of over fifty millions—are considered! And whilst further study of the Peace River will be carried on, as recommended by Mr. Fleming, we would, in the most energetic terms possible, ask that the country from Norway House to Quebec should be surveyed. Parliament would then be in a position, with a full knowledge of the case, to decide finally the location of our National Railway—either by the present line or by the Hewson route—which latter route has just received its confirmation from the Pacific to Norway House—and which, if feasible, from Norway House to Quebec, will give us our truly Imperial and National location

The importance furthermore of not committing the country hastily, and of waiting the issue of the negotiations still going on between the Home and Federal authorities, cannot be over-estimated. England cannot, and will not continue much longer to refuse her co-operation in the building of this Imperial military road from the Atlantic to Vancouver, her future stronghold on the Pacific. We have already touched upon the Imperial interests in British Columbia, which are immediate and of primary importance, whereas ours are remote and secondary. Naturally England would prefer to receive the benefits of the road at no cost to herself; very likely will she be prepared to distribute Imperial titles and rewards with a liberal hand to reach this result. But it is the duty of Parliament to guard our interests with firmness, and to refuse to play this game.

Under existing circumstances we would therefore call upon our sister Province, instead of upbraiding us because we will not undertake an impossible task, and even this prematurely ; instead of menacing us with a withdrawal from the Union, which could be of no earthly practical advantage to herself ; instead of insulting us with threats of Imperial coercion, rather to rise equal to the occasion and to join with us in urging upon the Home authorities the imperative necessity of coming to the rescue—and in the meanwhile, pending the issue of the negotiations with the Home authorities, and our ability to undertake this formidable task of construction through British Columbia, to accept a fair annual grant for the building of roads, bridges, and other local improvements, far more in keeping with her present population and true requirements, than a long and costly railway, which, were it built, it would be impossible to operate for many years to come.

It is only by mutual forbearance that we can hope to hold together ; and it is in this early stage of our national existence, when our mutual interests are only beginning to dawn upon us, that this spirit of forbearance is imperatively needed. If justice, moderation and fair play to all parts and all classes do not prevail in the councils of the nation, the days of the Dominion are already numbered.

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ARTICLE XI.

THE FUTURE IN STORE.*

The late debate in the House of Commons on the railway question, if not consoling, has certainly been highly instructive, and is commencing to bear fruit. The recklessness of the administration which has presided over this great work since its inception has been clearly exposed—estimates have been exceeded in practice by over 100 per cent. Mr. Dawson has stated to the House, that a section of 100 miles between Thunder Bay and Red River, originally estimated at \$23,000 per mile, will cost \$10,000,000—and in the Yale Kamloops contracts the Chief Engineer, on the face of the form of tender, avows his ignorance of the final cost of this work.

Is it surprising then, that the people of Canada are becoming thoroughly alarmed in the face of the facts brought to light, which point to an ultimate outlay of some \$150,000,000 on this railway—and this with a revenue evidently unequal to the strain involved therein?

It may be safely affirmed, that the country has been led into undertaking this gigantic work under the assurance that it would be accomplished without increasing the rate of taxation; and that both political parties—Conservative and Liberal—are equally responsible for the serious position in which the country finds itself to-day.

The crisis brought on by the lettings in British Columbia, demands firm action. Any further acquiescence in fallacious

* This Article is not included in the series published by the "Chronicle."

assertions and delusive assurances, one step more, and the country will be irrevocably committed to construction through this Province, and to a location which has just been condemned. Unless the Yale Kamloops contracts are annulled, under the pressure of a refusal of an appropriation by Parliament, the works will be commenced this spring, and the die will have been cast.

We have taken our stand. We are opposed to the present policy—because the present location is fatally defective; we appeal to Marcus Smith, to Surveyor-General Dennis, and to other competent authorities, to bear us out in this assertion: because the cost of construction is extravagant beyond reason, and any possible requirement; we have given the official figures so far available, and they point to a final average cost of over \$50,000 per mile: because the commencement of construction at this stage in British Columbia would be premature; our attempts to realize upon our public lands have failed so far, as likewise our negotiations with the Imperial Authorities; and Mr. Fleming, the Chief Engineer, whilst now recommending Port Simpson as the Western Terminus of the road on the Pacific Coast, with further surveys to improve this location, deprecates the immediate commencement of operations: the Government are not competent authority to override the decision of their professional adviser in a matter of such momentous importance.

In the general interests we ask the annulment of the Yale Kamloops contracts, and also these further surveys in the Peace River District; and whilst this is being done, likewise the survey of the country from Norway House to Quebec.

And in the general interests we would also ask Parliament, whilst it is yet time, not to commit the country to the present location, before this survey from Norway House to Quebec has been made, because should this last prove

successful, we would then have in the Hewson route our truly Imperial and National location, with all its future incalculable advantages.

That we have been discounting the future with prodigality; that we have, since some years, been accumulating immense liabilities with alarming rapidity; and that we have about reached the limit, beyond which it would be perilous to venture, may be seen from an examination of the following table of the Census Returns, and the annual returns of revenue, expenditure and of the Public Debt.

	Population.	Revenue.	Expenditure	Debt.	
1852...	1,842,265	\$ 2,582,504	\$ 2,604,500	\$ 18,664,772	Ont. and Quebec.
1861...	2,506,765	7,841,311	9,318,180	58,326,478	do.
1871...	13,779,529	12,213,286	88,444,890	do.
1876...	3,485,761	19,335,560	15,623,051	115,492,682	Dominion.
1878...	22,445,655	23,573,802	158,449,356	do.

This attempt to force the ordinary course of nature, regardless of consequences, is dangerous in the extreme, and, if it be persisted in, it will shake and derange our social fabric in its very foundations. Do we not already see an exodus of alarming proportions from the older Provinces? Can this exodus arise from the excessive cost of living, the result, in this early stage of our existence, of an undue load of taxation—Federal, Local and Municipal? The Government, surely, in their enormous outlays in the West, cannot be simply aiming at transplanting our people from the older Provinces to the Prairie Region! On the contrary, a care for the future, must lead us to retain, and to develop, by all means possible, the population and the resources of our older Provinces, whilst we are endeavoring to fill up our North-West territory with European emigration.

The signs of this forcing—this hot house process—are already visible in the desire of the Government to tamper

with our monetary institutions and with the currency of the country. There are not 100 miles of our National Railway in operation; there are but some \$15,000,000, out of an ultimate outlay of some \$150,000,000, expended on the road, and already the necessities are such as to compel a forced loan on the people. The Finance Minister has announced that authorization will be asked to increase the issues of Dominion Notes by \$8,000,000, raising the total issue to \$20,000,000, against which will be held a gold reserve of 15 per cent., and 10 per cent of other securities. "*Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*" The thin end of the wedge, which is destined to destroy our national monetary system before long, was inserted some few years ago in the inaugurations of the Dominion Notes. And mark how rapidly the issues have since increased, and likewise how rapidly the gold reserve has decreased in proportion. And to-day the Finance Minister openly proposes to almost double the volume of these Notes, and absolutely with no increase whatsoever in the gold reserve; and he candidly avows that the object is to avoid the necessity of borrowing in the money market.

In the light of the Budget Speech may be clearly discerned two facts, the gravity of which it is all important the country should fully realize and appreciate. The first—the revenue has reached the limit of its elasticity. Figures have been skillfully manipulated, but notwithstanding every effort, the ominous fact stands forth, that the revenue of the country is altogether unequal to meet the strain which is being rapidly developed by our excessive expenditures; evidently no further appreciable expansion is anticipated. Notwithstanding an increase of 40 per cent. in the tariff last Session, the revenue for 1878-9 shows a deficit of over \$2,000,000; the present acknowledged deficit for 1879-80 of \$500,000, will certainly be very seriously exceeded in practice; and the apparent surplus of \$500,000

hoped for in 1880-81, will undoubtedly prove as delusive in reality as preceding hopeful statements to the country. Any further increase in the rate of taxation would be simply intolerable, and would only result in a decrease in the revenue—we have about reached the maximum load the country can carry. The second—that the immense outlays, which may be set down at somewhere near \$200,000,000 within the coming ten years, and which will have raised the column of our Public Debt to \$350,000,000 in round figures, must, and will, be provided for by an irredeemable currency. Is there a man to-day in Canada who does not see that we are entering upon an era of inflation with its inevitable reaction within a few years. The issues of Dominion Notes will expand with the outlays on the Pacific Railway and other public works, and probably at the rate of \$15,000,000 per annum; and within a few years the guarantee of a redemption in gold—based on a strong gold reserve, which is the only means whereby these Notes can be maintained at par—will have disappeared, or have become simply illusory; otherwise this substitution of the Government paper would be of no practical use to meet the emergency—the necessities of the Treasury.

The currency of the civilized world is based upon gold; with gold is settled the balance of trade between nations. Evidently, therefore, Canada cannot pretend to substitute to this basis an irredeemable currency, unless indeed, she is prepared to shut herself off from all intercourse with the outer world.

With the disappearance of the gold-basis, the country will have entered upon a career of extravagance in every department and walk of life, encouraged and facilitated by the apparently easy process of printing off money; and will have embarked upon a course already travelled over by many nations, and history tells us with what disastrous consequences. The theories which are now being pressed

upon the acceptance of the country, have already been propounded and refuted—and this in practice. We need not go further back than some ten years or so, to the United States, to see the consequences which follow in the wake of an irredeemable currency—gold reached over 300 per cent. premium; the public morality was completely destroyed; and ruin was spread broad-cast over the length and breadth of the land, as the result of the unparalleled derangement in all values. If the American people have given us the example of a resuscitation of which history furnishes no similar instance, this does not warrant our embarking on a similar career; we are not placed in similar conditions.

We leave it with Parliament to say what must, what will be the consequences in the near future, if the country enters upon this career. Is it not clear, that ere long an uncontrollable desire for a change in our political system will seize upon our people as an escape from an intolerable situation? And what true change can there be but in annexation?

Our sole chance of remaining an integral portion of the Empire, and of preserving our manhood and freedom, lies in the prudent development of our resources, in the upright administration of our public affairs, in the encouragement of frugal habits among our people, in the cultivation of a spirit of justice among all sections and classes, and in the keeping down of the rate of taxation. Any other course will end disastrously.

We again suggest the building of this railway by private enterprise, instead of its construction as a Government work, with all its inevitable extravagance. We are as yet but at the threshold of this colossal work, and already have we purchased experience at an excessive cost. With a moderate measure of assistance private Companies could probably be found willing to undertake the construction of this road through the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario, on the Hewson location, which would open up the back country of these

Provinces. There could be no difficulty in securing construction through the Prairie Region by private enterprise in view of the excellence of the land in this favored part of the Continent. We would leave with the Imperial Authorities, for the reasons given in previous Articles, the task of carrying the road from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Coast. Under this method of construction, our National Railway would be secured at the minimum of cost to the country; and our people and public men be preserved from the misdeeds, corruption and scandal, lurking under the present system of manipulating the millions which will be spent in the carrying out of this colossal work.

We avow our desire to see this Imperial and National road built. We are prepared for construction through the Prairie Region on a proper location and sound financial basis. Furthermore, whilst opposing the immediate commencement of construction in British Columbia as premature, we will go a step further and declare our willingness to accept this task, after having received a final answer from the Imperial Authorities in the pending negotiations; coupling, however, with this declaration, the condition, that operations shall only be commenced when the finances of the country will permit without the necessity of increasing the rate of taxation, and at the same time meeting the just claims of the older Provinces on the Federal Treasury.

If we oppose the present policy, it is because this policy will defeat each and every one of the objects which the people of Canada had in view in undertaking the construction of this trans-continental railway.

With Parliament rests the responsibility of meeting the issue which has been raised; may Parliament be equal to the occasion. The consequences which will follow from the solution which must be given are truly alarming to contemplate.